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ABSTRACT
Thispaper analyses the changing economic value of higher education
in the major 0.E.C.D. countries. The first part of thestudy examines
data on earnings by education or earnings in occupationscomposed of per-
sons with different educational attainments. A second part looks at un-
employment rates and the occupations attained by college graduates. Both
the relative earnings data and the unemployment and occupational attainment
data suggest that the heralded decline in the economicvalue of higher
educationin the U.S. is not a unique North American phenomenon, but rather,
a general development throughout the developed world, On the basis of
evidence on elasticities of substitution and the observed growth in the
supply of college graduates the paper suggests that the decline in the
premium to the educated reflects movement along a reasonably well—defined
demand for graduates schedule due to the growth of the college anduniversity
systems of the various countries.
Richard B. Freeman
National Bureau of Economic Research
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, Mass. 02138
(617)868—3915One of the distinctive aspects of modern economic growth has been
increased investments in higher education. During the 1950s and l960s college
anduniversity systems expanded throughout the developed world, fueled by the
belief that education offered a sizeable economic return to the individual and
was an important means of societal growth. With rare exception, policymakers
andanalysts viewed higher education as a major road to economic well—being and
in some instances as a panacea to social problems, including reduction of income
inequality. Resources flowed into higher education in unprecedented amounts.
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sitiescame to employ more persons and to account for a larger share of gross
national product than the steel or automobile industries.1 Spurrea by a relati—
vely high rate of return and good job opportunities, anincreasing pro1ortion of
young persons chose to enroll for hiher education.
The 1970s witnessed a marked chane in the economic position of the
highly educated through most of the western world. Thejob market for graduates
underwent a significant turnaround and growthof enrollments levelled off or
declinedrelative to the relevant age group. While the timing and magnitude of
thechange differ among countries, there was a general reversal of the boom of
previous decades.
This paper examines the quantitative dimensions of the changing economic
status of the highly educated, and considers the economic forces that appear to
underlie the changes. Section I analyzes several indicators of the state of the
graduate market in severalcountries the earnings of graduate workers relative
to nongraduates, where these are not available or sparse, the earnings in occu-
pations where graduates predominate to those where they do not, unemployment
rates for graduates; and the composition of jobs obtained by graduates. It—2—
finds noticeable declines in the earnings of graduates relative to other
workers, reductions in the proportion of graduates in jobs traditionally filled
by college—level workers, and noticeable increases in graduate unemployment.
Section II seeks to explain the observed changes in terms of arelatively
simple supply—demand model of the graduates market in which the increase in
relative supply of graduates exceeding increases in relative demanu reduce the
economic advantage of college or university traininb. In addition, somecon-
sideration is given to the alternative hypothesis that the decline in the uni-
versity premium is due to trade union or governmental efforts maintain the ear-
nings of the less educated in a period of slow economic growth.
I. Quantitative DimensionsofChange
A sizeable and growing body of evidence has found that the economic
position of hiahly educated workers, particularly recent or young graduates,
underwent significant deterioration relative to that of other workers in the
U.S. in the 1970s. Is this pattern of a declining premium to higher education
also true of other developed countries, or is it a development distinct to the
U.S.?
To answer the question, this section examines evidence on theearnings
of educated workers relative to less educated workers or on the earnings of
workers in occupations composed largely of graduates to those in other
occupations, on graduate unemployment, and the type of jobs obtained by gra-
duates in a large number of developed countries. While the quality of the data
and the timing of changes differs from country to country, the evidence presents
overwhelming support for the proposition that the_economic_advantages of higher
education declined throughout the developed_world in the period_studied. In a—3—
majorityof the countries moreover, the bulk of the decline occurred in the
early part of the decade, with the position of graduates more or less stabi-
lizing towardthe end of the l9IUs.
Table1summarizesthe earnings data. Where possible the information
relates theearnings of college graduates to nongraduates, but in some cases, I
reportratios of incomes in occupations where graduates predominate to those
in occupations where they do not. This assumes that at least some inferences
can be made about education premium from occupational earnings patterns. In
several cases the published data show breaks or jumps due to changes in defini-
tions or methods of computing averages. Where this occurs I report both fiaures
and infer changes in ratios over the entire perioo from the sum of the two
changes.The precise definition of earnings or incomes differs across
countries; fringe benefits, which have become an increasingly important part of
the returns to labor in recent years, are generally excluded, and aLl of the
data relate to before—tax earnings. Exclusion of fringesundoubtedLybiases the
figures, though its effect on changes in ratios is ecjuivocal. On the one hand,
fringes tend to be a higher proportion of pay among the higher paid; on the
other hand, the fringes of the manuaL workers have increased greatly in recent
years, with many fringes traditionally given to the higher—level workers now
given to other workers in enterprises. Overall, because the major changes found
in the data are quite sizeabie, I doubt that lack of data on fringes seriously
distorts the pattern.
One other aspect of the data deserves attention. Sometimes the figures
reported relate to workers of al.L ages, at other times, they refer to starting
wages or the wages of young workers. While it would have been desireahie to—4—
obtain consistent figures for each country, I was limited by the published
data sources. Analyses of U.S. figures show larger declines in the relative
earnings of younger graduates than of older graduates, which suggests that
the decline in relative earnings was concentrated among new graduates. If
this is generally the case, the data for all workers in several other
countries understates the dimensions of the decline among the graduates of
the 1970s.
With this brief discussion of the data and calculations behind us,
let us now examine the figures in Table 1, country by country, beginning
with the English—speaking nations where migration might be expected to cause
similar patterns of change.
English—speaking countries
For the United_States, Table 1 shows declines in the income of
college graduates relative to high school graduates of sizeable magnitude
from 1969 to 1974, followed by rough stability in the ensuing period, with
some increases and some decreases in the ratios. In all cases, however,
the end of decade income ratios lie far below the ratios at the outset of
the decade. The biggest declines occur for younger workers and for those
with doctoral degrees. Detailed analyses of these patterns of changes
suggest that they translate into declines in rates of return of 3—4 per-
centage points, from the 10%—liZ levels of the late 1960s to perhaps 7%
in the 1970s.2
The figures for Australia in Table 1 reveal a similar pattern of
declining advantage to the college educated. In this case I have incomes
for university degree holders and for all persons without degrees. Since the
latter includes persons who have not graduates secondary school, the ratios
tend to be higher than those for the U.S. With respect to the trends of—5--
TABLE1
The Changing Income Advantage
to Higher Education in Develojed Countries
United States
(a) Ratio of Income of Full—time
Year Round Workers with Four
Years of College to Income of
Full—time Year Round Workers Change
withFour Years of High School 1969 1974 1978 1969—78
1.Men,25—34 1.39 1.16
1.20 1.22 _.21*




4. AllWomen 1.36 1.35
1.28
(b)Starting Salaries of Collee
Men Workinb in Industry to Change
AverageAnnual Earnings 1969 1971 1979/811969—79/81
5.Bachelor's 1.24 1.09 1.05 —.19
6. Doctorate 2.18 1.78 1.87 —.31
Australia
Mean Income of Workers with
agree toMean Income t Change
workers without a Degree, and left 1969 1974 1979 1969—79
school at 17, by age
1.25—34 1.81 1.63 —.37
2.35—44 2.13 1.78 1.58 —.55
3. 45—54 2.46 2.10 1.65 —.81
4. All 2.29 2.01 1.90 —.39—6—
Canada
(a) Ratio of the Income of
University Degree Recipients Change
to income of 1969 1974 1975 1978 1969—78
1. Elementary School Graduates
Those with 0—8 years 2.36 2.23 2.40 2.20 _•33*
2. High School Graduates
Those with some High School 1.95 1.81 2.03 1.90 _.27*
(b) Ratio of the Income of
Those with Some University
Training to Income of Those
with 0—8 years, by age (1969,
1974) or Ratio of the Income
of Those with University
Degree to Income of Those
With 0—8 years, by age Change
(1975, 1978). 1969 1974 1975 1978 1969—78
1. Aged 24 or less 1.32 1.21 1.71 1.17
2. 24—34 1.40 1.34 1.22 1.24 _.04*
3. 35—44 2.22 1.76 1.83 1.62 _.67*
4. 45—54 2.33 2.10 1.87 1.80
5. All Ages 1.59 1.44 1.56 1.54
(c) Ratio of the Income of
Those With Some University
to Those with Some High School
(1969 and 1974) and of the
Income of Those with
University Degrees to Those
With High School Degrees,
including nonuniversity Change
post—secondary (1975 and 1978) 1969 1974 1975 1978 1969—78
1. Aged 24 or less 1.11 .97 1.43 1.17 _.40*
2. 24—34 1.22 1.24 1.30 1.26 _.02*
3. 35—44 1.83 1.62 1.75 1.75 _.21*
4. 45—64 1.87 1.80 2.00 1.79 _.28*
5.AllAges 1.56 1.54 1.87 1.72 _.17*—7—
UnitedKingdom
(a)Ratio ofIndex number Change
of graduate starting salary 1961
toearnings frequency, university
sector 1.00 .84 .19 —.21
(b)Ratioof graduates starting
salariesto average weekly earnings Change
(x 52) of full—time workers 19.68 1974 1918 19—78
1. Male Arts and Social Science
/Manual .92 .74 .77 —.15
/Nonmanual .68 .58 .61 -.01
2. Male Arts and Social Science
/Youth 2.18 1.26 i.44
3.MaleScience
/Manuai .88 .80 .83 —.05
/Nonmanual .65 .62 .65 .00
(b) Change
(cont.) 1968 1974 1978 1968—18
4. Male AppliedScience
/Manual .92 .82 .86 —.06
/Nonlnanual .71 .64 .61
5. Female Arts and Social
Science/Female Manual i.6 1.25 1.28 —.48
/FemaleNonmanual 1.24 1.09 1.05 —.19
Change
(c)Income ofOccupationGroups 1970 1975 1979 1970—79
1. Chartered Engineers
/Nonmanualmales 1.00 1.03 —.07
(d)Index of Salaries of
Scientists Aged 26—30to Change
Nonmanual Workers 1968 1974 1968—14
1.Biologists 1.00 .85 —.15
2. Mathematicians 1.00 .81 —.19
3.Physicists 1.00 .92 —.08
4. Metallurgists 1.00 .94 —.06
5. Chemists 1.00 .89 —.11
6. Engineers 1.00 .82 —.18—8—
(e)Average Annual Earnings of
Self—employedProfessionals to Chan,e
Gross Weekly Earnings Manual Male 1910 1974 1977 1910—11
1. Architecture .50 .62 —.15
2. Engineering .69 .66 .56 —.13
3. Medicine 1.12 .86 .76 —.36
4. Dentistry 1.70 1.61 1.35 —.32
Japan
(a) Ratio of the Income of
College Graduates to High Change
School Graduates 1954 1967 1973 1954—73
1. 20214 1.16 .95 .95 —.21
2. 25—29 i.i6 1.10 1.03 —.13
3.30—34 1.26 1.21 1.15 —.11
(b) Ratio of Average Monthly Change
Earnings of College Graduates to 1965 1974 1975 1965—75
1. Elementary School Graduates
Male 1.32 1.22 1.21 —.11
Female 1.60 1.48 —.12
2.High School Graduates
Male 1.30 1.23 1.20 —.10
Female 1.37 1.27 —.10
France
(a) Ratio of Yearly Earnings
of Executive and Professional Change
Workers to Yearly Earnings of 1969 1976 1979 1969—79
1. Employees 2.97 2.63 2.55 —.42
2.Manual Workers 3.30 2.50 2.72 —.55—9—
(b) Ratio of YearlyEarnings of
Techniciansto Yearly Earningsof
1.Employees 1.63 1.61 1.55 —.05
2. Manual Workers 1.51 1.12 1.65 —.13
(c) Ratio of Incomes of Men
Under 35 with Specialized Change
Schooling to Office Workers 1962 1972 1962—72
1. Bachelor's Graduates 1.97 1.88 —.11
2.Higher Degree 2.49 2.49 .00
Italy
(a) Ratio of Average Earnings, Change University Graduates to 1967 1975 1979 1961—79
1. Elementary School Graduates 2.63 1.96 1.54 —1.09
(0—5 years)
2. Secondary School Graduates 2.07 1.61 1.33 —.i4
(b) Average Monthly Starting Change
Wages of Executive to 1972 1974 1978 1972—15
1.Clerk (143) 2.67 2.42 1.62 —1.05
2. Pdministratjve Assistant (120) 3.02 2.92 1.78
3.SkilledWorker in Gas Industry 2.146 1.99 1.12 —1.34
(1973)
4.UnskilledWorker in Chemical
Industry 3.15 2.90 1.54 —1.61
(1973)
Denniark
(a)Relative Wages and Salaries of
Central Government Employees on
Collectively Bargained Contracts, Chanbe
Persons with Academic Degree to 1971 1974 1978 1971—78
1.Other Salaried Employees 1.914 1.16 1.67 —.27
2. Wage Earners 2.22 1.96 1.12 —.50—10—
Germany
(a) Relative Gross Incouie of
TechnicalEmployees with Higher
Qualifications (Category II)
to Others with Lower Qualifi— Chanbe
cations (Iii, IV,v) 1963 1911 1918 1963—18
1. Males Il/Ill 1.32 1.29 i.2b —.06
2.Males II/IV 1.10 1.59 1.58 —.12
3.Males Il/V 2.13 1.91 1.86 —.21
1. Females Il/Ill 1.44 1.44 1.35 —.09
5.FemalesIl/V 2.33 2.31 2.01 —.32
*Note:The percentage point change corresponds to the difference
between the figure in first row, first column and the figure
insecondrow, third column added to the difference between




(a)U.S. Bureau oftheCensus, Current Population Survey Consumer Income
Series P—60, various editions.
Figureson 197kin the first row are based on old imputation
procedures. Those in second row are based on new imputation
procedures, as are figures for later years.
(b) Bachelor's from Frank S. Sndicott, The EndicottReport (Northwestern
University), various editions, using a rorted average ofsalaries
with weights .05 accounting, .35engineering,.40 sales, .20general
business trainees. Doctorate, unweighted average from. College
Placement Council, Salary Survey. Elsewhere, from U.S. Department of
Commerce, Survey of Current Business, National Income Editions.
Aiic+nol4
(a)Australian Bureau of Statistics, Income Distribution 1968—69, l973TL,
1918—19.
Table: Fullyear,full time workers: 'Educational Attainment Age
andMean Income'
Figures are based on two surveys conducted in November 1969,
November 197i nd November., 1979.
Canada
(a) Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Income Distribution by Size in Canada.
Table: 'Percentage Distribution of Individuals by Income Groups,
Education and Sex'
(b) Dominion Bureau of Statistics, Income Distribution by Size in Canada.
Table: 'Percentage Distribution of Individuals Whose Major Source of
Income is Earned Income, by Income Groups, Age, and Education'
Figures are based on surveys.
In 1975, the classifications by education were modified. For this reasons
data by education for 1975 and later years are not directly comparable with
previously published figures.—12—
United Kingdom
(a) A.M. Dolphin, "The Demand for Higher Education," iployment Gazette,
July 19b1, pp.302—305.
(b)G. Catto, A. Goodchild, P. Hughes, "Higher Educationand the
Employmentof Graduates". Department of Employment, Unit for Manpower
Studies.
G. Williams, "Graduates and the Labour Market," ThreeBanks Review,
September, 1913.
AnnualAbstract of Statistics. New Earnings Surveys. GreatBritain.
(c) Inland Revenue Statistics. "Professional Earnings IncomeTax
Assessments Under Case II, Schedule D: Net TrueIncome".
The median starting salaries of first dere graduates weretaken from the
G. Williams study for figures before 1913 and fromthe G. Catto study for
following years. In the latest case, we converted indexesnumbers back to
absolute figures.
United Kingdom
The average weekly salaries for manual and nonnianual workers come from New
Earnings Surveys. Before 1913, the collected figures referred to gross
weeklyearningsthat we splicea by maltiplying by a coefficient to get an
approximation of an average salary. We multiply by 52 to convert into
annual salaries.
The weekly earnings for youth were obtained by using the indexes given by
G. Williams before 1912, and the figures from the Annual Abstract of
Statistics.
Japan
(a) Umetarni, "The College Labor Market and the Rate of Return to Higher
Education in Post—War Japan, l94—i913", University of Wisconsin,
1971. Ph.D. dissertation.
(b) Japan Statistical Year Book.
Table: 'Average Age, Years of Service and Monthly Contract Cash
Earnings of Regular WorkersbyIndustry Size of Enterprise and
Academic Career'
The divisioncorresponds to level of school completed: Elementary level
corresponds to elementary schools and new system junior high schools; high
school level to old system middle school and new system senior high
schools; college level to old and new system colleges and universities.—13—
France
(aY&biINSEE Indicateurs du vlleme plan, Revue Trirnestrielle (in),
Octobre/Decembre,1980.
Table: 'Rapports des salaires des diverses categories au salaire
ouvrier (salaires nets annuels moyens)'.
We compute the ratio of executive/employee by dividing the column'Cadres'
by the column "emploes, remunerations annuelles' ,andthe ratio of
Technician/Employee by dividing the column 'Agents de maitriseet
techniciens' by 'employes, remunerations annuelles'.
(c) Psacharopoulos, George. Earnings and Educationin OECD Countries.
(1915).
Italy
(a)Bank ofItaly, Bollettino, provided by Paoli Roberti,Memorandum,
0.E.C.D.,September,1981.
(b) Annuario di Statistiche del Lavoro.
Tables: 'Composizione delle RZetribuzioni Mensile Lorde Iniziale del
Personale Civile dello Stato per Carriera e Qualifica' .'Composizione
dellaRetribuzione e del Costo del Lavoro nei Principali Settori di
Attivita Economicaper Alcune Categorie di Lavoratori'
Theonly statistics on highly cjualifiedemployeesavailablereferred to
the public sector. Though their income probably differs from the ones in
theprivate sector, they may beused as indicators with some restrictions.
We chose to compare the gross monthly total income of a high executive
(primo dirigente) with other professional positions within and outside the
publicsector. The rates were computed in relation to the gross monthly
total income of a clerk classified as l-3 (commisso cap l13)andan admi-
nistrativeassistant classified as 120 (coadiutore amministrativo 120).
Thecomparison was also made to workers in thechemical industry (D,
operaio2a categoria) and in the gas industry (Cl operaio qualificato).
The figures for these last two activities correspond to the gross monthly
total income computed on the minimum wage of single workers on a national
territory basis.




Table:'Wages and Salaries of Central GovernmentEmiloyees'




Table: "Bruttomonatsverdienste der Angesteilten in Industrie und
Handel".
Relative gross monthly incomes were computed relating the higher qualified
(categoric Ii) to lower qualified (categorie IlL, Iv, and v)techniciansin
the industry and commerce sector (industrie Handel, Kreditinstibute unde
versicherungsgewerbe).—15—
interest what stands out in the data is the sizeable percentage point decline
in the advantage for the more highly educated, with greater declines in the
first half of the decade for all but the 45—54 year olds. In contrast
to the U.S. data, the magnitudes of the changes in Australia show possibly
greater deterioration in the relative position of older graduates than
of younger graduates.
The next country in the table is Canada for which the data relate
the income of university graduates to the income of various groups of less
educated workers, overall, and by age. Because of changes in definitions in
the published figures I compare 1969 to 1974 and 1975 to 1978 separately
and obtain changes over the whole period by summing the 1969—74 and 1975—78
changes. While magnitudes of change differ among age groups, with the
24—34 group showing much smaller drops in relative income than is found in
the U.S. or Australia, the overall pattern is consistent. As in those
countries, the relative earnings of college graduates fell in the period
under study, by large amounts.
The evidence for the United Kingdom on educational groups in (a) and
(b) is based on the ratios of starting salary from the Leeds University
survey to the average earnings of other workers. The drop from 1968 to
1974 is uniform and large, with the institutionally—induced change in youth
apprentice rates severely reducing the advantage of graduates over youths.3
The decline is particularly marked for those in the Arts and Social Sciences
and for female graduates and, because of declines in the nonmanual to manual
income ratios for the United Kingdom, are exceptionally large relative to the
inceoms of manual workers. From 1974 to 1978 there is a general but modest
rise in the ratios, a pattern which is more consistent than that found
in the U.S. The occupation data in lines 5—7 show comparab].e trends for
various groups of highly qualified workers. Note that in these comparisons
the base group are nonmanual workers. Contrasts with manual workers would
reveal much more striking declines.Japan
Continental Europe
The remaining countries in Table 1 are on the continent of Europe. I
had greater probleras obtaining data for the continental countries than for
others and have been forced to rely in several cases on earnings by occupation
rather than by education. To the extent that, as seems reasonable, part of the
fall in the economic advantage to the highly educated takes the form of a
downgrading in occupations (this is definitely the case in the U.S. and Japan),
the occupation data will understate the actual deterioration in the position of
graduates.
—16—
Figures for Japan in lines (a) 1—3, taken from a University of Wisconsin
dissertation, show a pattern of decline in the relative earnings of graduates by
age which began in the mid—1950s and proceeded through the early 1970s, of a
magnitude similar to that obtained in the more recent decade for the English—
speaking countries. The data also show a more pronounced drop in relative inco-
mes for younger as opposed to older graduates, similar to that found in the
U.S., U.K., and Canada.
Lines (b)1 and (b)2 carry the analysis through 191b. They give the
ratios of average earnings of college graduates to elementary and high school
graduates. These figures provide further evidence of a fall off in the relative
pay of college graduates in Japan, with an overall drop of about 10 percentage
points for both men and women.—11—
Possible understatement notwithstandin5,, the evidence in Taule 1 shows
that for an countries there is a large droj in the income of those in jobs
reuirina more education relative to workers in jobs requiring less education.
The French data, in particular, show a marked fall in the advantage of
executives and managers compared to nonmanual 'employees' and manual workers and
a sizeable but less marked dro in the earnings of technical workers relative to
manual workers. Consistent with the pattern found in the English—speakin
countries, moreover, most of the decline in the ratios occurs in the first part
of the l9IIJs, from 1969 to 1916. Lines (c) 1 and 2 for France present data on
educational differentials themselves, but for an eary period. They reveal a
fall off in the advantage to bachelor's graduates but not to hiher degree reci-
pients in the 1960s.
Two sets of figures are given for Italy: (a) ratios of average
earnings of university graduates to elementary and secondary school graduates
and (b) ratios of the starting wages of public sector executives to other
workers in the public sector. The college earnings data show an enor-
mous decline in the relative earnings of graduates from advantages far
exceeding those in the U.S. in 1967 to figures comparable to those in the U.S.
by 1977. The public sector differentials reveal a similar pattern.
For Denmark the data are limited to part of the work force: central
government employees coverec by collective bargaining coritracts.They have the
disadvantage of providing no information on the private sector but the advantage
of relating to the academic degree recipients of concern. The figures tell a
clearstory: in Denmarkasin the other countries we have examined, the rela-
tive earnings of the more educatedfell.
Thefinal country in the table is Germany, where thedata relate the pay
oftechnical employees with higher qualifications to that of employees withlower q_ualifications. The figures show asizeabLe drop for the hihest group
relative to the lowest and more modest declines for the highestrelative to
other groups. As in Japan, however, the drop appears tohave begun in the l9bUs
rather than in the 1910s.
The conclusion that in Continental Europe, as in the English-speakiflb
countries and Japan, there was a marked fall in the relativeincome of the
highly educated in the periods covered is inescapable.
Interpretation
The Table 1 data support the following claim: In the English_speaking
countries, in Japan, and in the Western European countries,the relative ear-
nings of highly educated workers or of those in occupationsdominated by the
highly educated fall sharply in the l9TQs. In mostof the countries, moreover,
the declines appear to be greater in the early part ofthe 1970s than in the
latter part, possibly because of the potentially lar,er impactof the slowdown
in the world econon in the latter years on lesseducated workers. It is of
some interest to note that evidence on nonmanuaJto manual differentials or on
skill differentials amon nnual workers also havefollowed such a pattern. In
six of the seven Common Market countries for which data areavailable from
Eurostat, the nonmanual to manual worker earningsratio fell, with the greatest
decline in the early part of the decade.5 Marsden's 1981 analysisof pay dif-
ferentials in Britain, West Germany, France, and Italy providesadditional sup-
port for our analysis. He concludes that'there is evidence of a similar long—
term reduction in the differential for higher—paidnonxianual occupations' in all
of those countries with some indication that thedecline showed at the end of
the 1910s (p. 309). While declines in higher paidnonmanual worker earnings to—19—
manualworker earnings do not necessarily imply declines in the relative pay of
graduates, such a pattern is consistent with the evidence in Table 1 about the
rewards to higher education.
Unemployment and non-price indicators
Market adjustments to changes in the supply—demand balance involve more
than simplymovement of relative prices. Ifthe economic position of the highly
educated deteriorated, as indicated by the wage data in Table 1, we mightaLso
expectunemployment and nonprice indicators of economic status to show co-
parabledeclines as well.6
Table 2summarizes available data regarding the typesof jobs obtained
bygraduates and various indicators of unemployment. Measures of the proportion
of graduates in 'college—level' occupations proviae a statistic that is easier
to intetpret than unemployment rates, as declines in the proportion in jobs tra-
ditionally requiring a degree can be taken at face value as indicative of a
deterioration in market conditions, Because unemployment varies cyclically,
particularly for manual workers, on the other hand, comparisons of the rates for
both college graduates and less educated workers are complicated: the ratio of
the rates may decline, while the difference may widen for cyclical rather than
reasons of structural change in the market. One way of dealing with this
problem is to regress the unemployment rate of graduates on the unemployment
rate for other workers and examine deviations from the regression line. I have
made such calculations for the U.S. but not for other countries.
The U.S. data in lines 1 and 2 highlight one of the most important
aspects of the declining market for graauates in that country: the decline in
the percentage of graduates finding employment in the job areas normally held by
college graduates, the one—digit professional and technical category. When one—20-.
focuses Oflthemarginal as opposed to the average likelihood ofobtaining
professional, technical and kindred jobs, the story of deteriorationis even
stronger.From 1962to1965, the number of college graduates in the labor
force grew by 14,011,000, whereas the number of graduates with professional jobs
grew by 2,915,000 —implyinbthat 131o of the additional college workers got pro-
fessional employment. From 1969 to 197b, by contrast, when the number of gra-
duates grew by 5,096,000, the number obtaining professional jobs grew by just
3,751,000 —a146%rateof employment in the professions. From 1976 to 1979, the
number of graduates increased by 3,106,205, while the number working as pro
fessionals increased by 1,627,000 —a1414% rate of enloyment in the
professions.T
The U.S. unemployment rates show a noticeable increase in the rate for
graduates, but as noted earlier this could represent either astructural change
or a normal cyclic pattern. To see whether the period under studydeviates from
earlier periods I regressed the rate of unemployment of collebe graduates onthe
rate for hih school graduates and the rate of unemployment of professional
workers on the rate of unemployment for blue collar workers. Figure 1 showsthe
results. As can be seen by the dark areas, there does appear to be astructural
change,with graduate (professional) employment worse relative to highschool
(bluecollar) unemployment than inthepast.
The Canadian data show similar patterns of change,with the graduates'
unemployment rate rising sharply, from less than to14.1%in1911butthen
fallingto 3.14% in 1917. As the nongraduate rate also rises substantively,it
is unclear if the orseriing in the position of graduates is more orless than
would be expected under pre_1910s conditions. If the U.S. patterns are any
indication, the graduates' situation would appear to have worsened.—21—
TABLE2
Unemployment and Job Attainment Indicators
United States
(a) Proportion of Workers with 1 or
more years of college in professional,
technical and kindred occupational
category 1969 1915
1.Males .61 .514 .52
2.Females .81 .70 .65
(b)Unemployment rates, by
education 1961 1915 1978
3. College .9 2.9 2.5
4.HighSchool 3.2 9.1 6.2
Canada
(a) Unemployment rates, by
education 1961 1971 1977
1.Secondary school 9.3






(a)Percentage of first degree 1962 1969 1979
universitygraduates still seeking
permanent employment 3.0 4.5 10.9
(b) Unemployment rates for
entireworkforce 2.2 2.4 5.8—22—
Japan
(a) Proportion of graduates 1960 1970 1974 1979
inprofessional and technical
jobs 35.0 32.0 28.0 26.0
ium
(a) University level as percentage
of total unemployed receivinb 1971 1975 1979
unemployment compensation (Oct.) (Dec.) (Dec.)
1. Male .59 1.80 1.53
2. Female .25 1.02 .90
3. AllPersons .46 1.39 1.24
Denmark
(a) Rate of unemployment among
members of unemployment insurance
funds 1975 1977 1979
1. cadernics 5.6 9.8 7.8
2. Engineers 6.5 4.3 2.3
3. Lawyers and Economists 11.6 9.8 6.1
4.Mastersof Arts&Sciences 4.3 12.5 11.3
5.Total 11.1 11.4 9.2
Germany
(a) Ratio of number of unerriployed 1972 1974 1979
engineer, chemist, physicist,
mathematician to total unemployed .60 .94 1.07
Italy 1970 1973 1979
1. Ratio of graduates lookinb for
first job to degrees granted .35 .49 .6b— 23—
Table2 (cont.)
Italy 1910 1913 1971
2. Percentage of experienced
unemployed who are graduates .7' 1.2 2.6
3. Eate of unemployment,
(including persons seeking first
job as unemployed)
Graduates 3.5 5.9
Total Labor Force 3.1 3.1 5.0
France
(a) Unemployment rates 1910 1975 1911 1980
1. Professionals & executives .81.6 1.6 1.9 2.2
2.Middle level executives .81.9 1.9 2.6 3.2
3.Employees i.4 3.6 4.0 5.4
4.Manual workers 1.7 3.8 3.9 4.7 6.1k— 2—
TABLE2 (Sources)
UNITED STATES:
(a)U.S. Department of Labor, Educational Attainment of Workers, March,
1969, Special Labor Force Report 125, Table 1, p. A—28, Special Labor
Force Report i86, Table 1, p. A—19, Special Labor Force Report 24O,
Table 5, p. A—19.
(b) U.S. Department of Labor, Educational Attainment_of Workers, March,
1916 and March, 1919. Special Labor Force Report 92, Table 1, p.
A—15 Special Labor Force Report 193, Table 3, p. 6, Special Labor
Force Report 225, Table 2, p. A—l9.
Figuresfor 1967 correspond to total 18 years and over, figures for
1975 and 197b correspondto total 6years and over.
CANADA:
(a)S.Ostry,M. Zaide, Labour Economics in Canada. Toronto, 1979.
Table:'Unemployment Rates by Level of Education 1961, 1971'
Statistics Canada —LabourForce Surveys.
Table: 'Estimates by Educational Attainment'. Figures referred to
areannual averages.
WilTED KINGDOM:
(a)Department of Employment Unit for Manpower Studies —"Employmentof
the Highly Qualified, 1971-1986".
Table: 'First Degree Graduates "Still Seeking Employment",
Unemployment Rates and Unemployment Among School Leavers", with 1979
from G. Catto, A. Goodchild, P. Hughes, "Higher Education and the
Employment of Graduates". Department of Employment —Unitfor
Manpower Studies.
Table:F—i, p. 75 ('First Degree University Graduates Unemployed or
in Temporary or in Overseas Employment 1972—1979') by adding the gra-
duates 'believed unemployed' to the graduates 'in temporary home
employment' and dividin by the toeal graduates 'of known
destination'
(b) The Employment Gazette.—25—
TABLE 2 (Sources -_cont.)
JAPAN:
(a) 1960—197)4, Umetami, "The College Labor Market and the Rate of Return
to Higher Education in Post—4ar Japan, l954—l9T3",Universityof
Wisconsin, 1917, with 1979 from Japan Statistical Year Book, 1950.
Table: 'Population 15 years old and over by age, group employment
status and level of education'.
BEmIUM:
(a) ONEM —OfficeNational de L'Emploi, bulletins mensuels.
Table: "Chomeurs Complets indemnises inscrits en fin de mois'
Unemployment figures for the university level correspond to the num-
bers of college graduates, civil engineers and other persons with some
college education.
DENMARK:
(a) Statistisk rbog —DAI'JMARK.
Table:'Unemployment Among Members of Unemployment Insurance Funds'.
Most of the professions corresponding to post—secondary education are
introduced in the table in 1975. For former years no indicators of
unemployment could be found at this level.
FRANCE:
(a)Indicateurs du y1jeIse plan —RevueTrimestrielle (14)
Octobre/Decembre, 1950.
Table: 21.2.2b; 'k(aplxrt Demandeurs d'emploi salarie
Population active de la categoric
selon la categoric socio_professionnelle de l'activite perdue'
The two colwnns for 1975 represent the values of the rates before and
after some changes were introduced in the statistics computation.
GERMANY:
(a) Statistiche Bundesamt.
Table: 'Arbeitsiose und Of fine Stellen Nach Berufsgruppen'—26--
TABLE2 (Sources —cont.)
ITALY:
1)Mnuario di statistiche del lavoro.
Table: 'Persone in Busca di Prima Occupazione per Titulo di Studio'
Annuario statistico italiano.
Table: 'Laureati per Sesso e Corso di Laurea'
2) Annuario di statistiche del lavoro.
Table:'Disoccupati per Titulo di Studio' .Therate corresponds to
unemployed graduates divided by total unemployment.
3)Mnuariodi statistiche del lavoro.
Table: 'Disoccupati per Titulo di Studio' ; 'Persone in Busca di Prima
Occupazione'; 'Occupati per Tituto di Studio'
Unemployment rates (for lines 3and)werecomputed by dividing the
sum(unemployedpersons and persons looking for first job) by the total
of (unemployed persons anu persons looking for first job and employed
persons).
The ratio in line 3 refers to graduates. The ratio in line )4 refers to
total labor force.—27—
The story for the United Kingdom is similar, with the evidence in line 1
showing a definite worsening in the ease with which first degree recipients find
jobs: the proportion still seeking employment in December of the year was 3% in
1962, in 1979 it was still 11%, whereas the rate of total unemployment rose more
modestly. In 1962 the ratio of the percentage of first degree university graduates
still seeking permanent employment to the total unemployment rate was 1.4; the
figure rose to 1.9 by 1969 and was still at that level in 1979. However, our
data do not extend to the recent doubling of total unemployment in the British
economy.
The limited figures I have obtained for Japan show a drop in the propor-
tion of graduates in professional and technical jobs, though in Japan, unlike
the U.S., the majority of graduates are employed in managerial and clerical
rather than professional jobs.
Turning to the European continent, the Belgium data are perhaps the most
striking as they show a tripling in the proportion of the unemployed persons
receiving unemployment compensation accounted for by those with university
education, an increase that has to far exceed the increase in the university
share of the work force over the period.
The figures for Denmark show sizeable rates of unemployment for selected
groups of highly qualified workers, except engineers. Compared to the average
rate in the country, the figures reveal higher rates for graduates of arts and
sciences and academics, a pattern consistent with data for the U.S. which
suggest a greater worsening in the market for academicfields.8
The Italian data by education which I have obtained do not give normal
rates of unemployment. They distinguish between graduates looking for their
first job, the experienced unemployed, and the employed. I use the fitures to
calculate three types of statistics. The ratio of graduates looking for first
jobs to degrees granted in line 1 for Italy is an indicator of the difficulties





Actual Unemployment of Professional, Technical & Kindred
Workers vs. that Predicted from Blue—Collar Unemploynent
... — p • p pi u P PII IIII
1958 60 62 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78 80
Professional unemployment rate =
= .47
.63 + .21 Blue Collar unemployment rate
(.05)
Actual Unemployment rate of College (4 or more years) Graduates
Aged 25—34 and that Predicted from High School Graduates unemployment
rate, 25—34 year olds
IIIIIIIIII $ I S P
1962 64 66 68 70 72 74 76 78





Source: U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics; Special Labor
Force Reports, Educational Attainment of Workers, various editions.
U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of liLabor Statistics; Handbook of






(graduatesseeking first job will include those from previous years' classes),
the magnitude should not be taken as an unemployment rate, as normallydefined.
The trend, however, is sufficiently striking to suggest a distinct worsening in
the position of graduates, consistent with reports of major problems in the
Italian marketplace. Line 2 records the percentage of the experienced
unemployed who are graduates. It shows that university graduates have more than
tripled their share of unemployment in the period 1970—1979 froiri 0.7% to 2.6%;
since the graduate share of the work force has not come close to tripling (from
1(17(1 4- 1 (1 7 (j9 tuegraduate share of employment rose from 3.1% to 4.6%),this
impliesa distinct trend in relative unemployment rates. Finally, lines 3 and 4
recordthe relevant unemployment rates, where the number ofpersons seeking
first jobs are included in both the numerator and denominator of the statistic.
These data show a rate for graduates in excess of that for the entire work force
in the decade.
In France the data for unemployment rates by occupation show noticeable
increases in the rates for professionals and executives and for middle level
executives. Whether these increases are more/less/about what would be expected
on the basis of past patterns of cyclic change we have not deterrnineu.
In Germany the proportion of the unemployed in scientific and technicaloccupa—
tions rose by nearly 80% in the space of just seven years.
Overall, while the data in Table 2 suffer from various problems of non—
comparablity across countries, the preponderance of the evidence suggests that
the unemployment of graduates and their employment prospects worsened in the
1970s, probably though not definitely, to a greater than normal extent during an
economic slowdown. Since the 1970s were a period of sluggish economic growth,
however, it is important to recognize that the unemployment of the nongraduate
labor force tended to increase more in percentage points than did the graduate
unemployment rate.—30-
11. EconOmic Determinantsof Change
What factors exLain the observed declines inthe economic position of
highly educated workers in the O.h.C.D.countries shown in tables 1 and 2?
in this section I seek to explain theobserved patterns in terms of
changes in the relative supply anddemand for graduates, with theprincipal
moving force being the rapid expansion of highereducation of the l960s. I
develop a small supply—demand model designedto pin down the key forces at work
andexamine empirical evidence regarding the magnitude ofthe relevant paratue—
ters of change. Finally, i consider one possiblealternative explanation of
change:that the decline in the relative position of graduatesstems not from
the increased supply of graduates but rather fromtrade union and governmental
policies which maintained the position of lesseducated workers in the face of
an overall drop in the market for labor ofvarious types.
The supply-demand framework
Let X =rateof change in the location of the demand curve foruniver-
sity graduates relative to the demand forother workers; S =rateof change in
the position of the supply of university graduatesrelative to other workers;
o =theelasticity of demand for university graduatesrelative to other workers
which in the current context can be represented bythe elasticity of
substitutiOn, c =theelasticity of supply of university graduatesdefined
"relative to the number of potential students.
Then the change in relative demand for graduateswill be:
(1) E=X-OW
where E =rateof change in relative employment of graduates aridW =rateof




Assume, for simplicity, that the labor market clears, so that E =Es.
Then the economic advantage received by college graduates will depend on the
shift (s, x) and slope (e, a) parameters as follows:
(3) W=(x—s)/(c+a)
Equation (3) shows, that when shifts in supply for educated labor exceed
shifts in demand, relative wages will fall. The extent of the fall is con-
ditioned by the elasticity of substitution between more and less qualified labor
and the elasticity of supply. Figure 2 shows graphically how the effect of
changes in supply and demand depends critically on the relevant elasticities.
Taking the demand side first, panel A distinguishes between the extreme case in
which the elasticity of substitution between more/less educated workers is inf i—
nite and the case in which it has a more modest value. In the infinite elastic
case, changes in the demand for and supply of educated labor have no effect on
relative wages. Turning to supply, panel B shows a similar situation with an
infinite and noninfinite elasticity of supply. It makes the point that if
investments in human capital are perfectly elastic at a going rate of return, as
is often implicitly assumed in human capital models, then relative wages are
fixed at a level solely suppJ' determined.
What has happened to the four determinants in the period studied?
Shifts in supply (s)
Twofactorscaused a significant increase in the supply of highly edu-
cated workers in the 1910s: the entry of the 'baby boom' generation into the—32—
FIGURE 2
Role of Demand and Supply Elasticities in ExplainingCFianging




Infinite elastic demand: shifts in
supply/demand have no effect
Relative
Wage
Infinite elastic supply: shifts in
demand/supply have no effect
Finite elastic demand: increases in
supply reduce education premium




















labor market (which, of course, differed somewhat in timing acrosscountries)
and the increased propensity of young persons to enroll in higher educational
programs over the period. Because of the time lag between decisions to enroll
in university and graduation and entr,y into the job market, we take the increase
in the supply of graduates due to the enrollment expansion of the 1960s as a
shift in supply (s) in the 1970s.
Table 3 presents comparable international data which document this well—
known phenomenon and provide some magnitude of the changes. It shows that bet—
ween 1960 and 1910 the absolute and relative number of persons entering univer-
sities (and thus graduating in the l970s) doubled or even tripled in many
countries. Data for a limited number of countries for which I have figures on
graduates confirm that the tremendous increase in enrollments showed up in gra-
duates in the l9TOs. Between 1970 and 1916 in the U.S. the ratio of 25—34 year
old college to high school graduates rose from .38 to .57 ——a50%rise.9 In the
U.K., the number of degrees granted 20—24 year olds rose from .ii6 to .i44 from
1970 to 1975,10 while in Japan the number of new college graduates relative to
new high school graduates increased by over 5O, from .24 in 1970 to .37' in
1975.11 Any economic explanation of the declining economic value of higher edu-
cation will rest heavily on the striking increase in supply in the period.
Shifts in Demand
In the absence of detailed country studies of the employment of gra-
duates by sectors and of sectoral rates of growth, along the lines of the fixed
coefficient model often used by governmental forecasters, it is difficult to say
much about the demand side for the bulk ci' the countries. On the basis of





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































*1975for Australia, Germany, and U.K.; 1979 for Denmark, France and Japan.
**For Beliuinthe final year is 1914; forCanada,1971—1916; for Denmark, the
final year is 1976, for Sweden, 1916, for U.K., 1915, for U.S., the final
year is 1916.
Column 1: O.E.C.D., Working Papers of the Education Committee, 25/11/77
Columns 2, 3: O.E.C.D., Educational Statistics of the O.E.C.D. Countries, 1951,
Table 54, with updates from unpublished O.E.C.D. data.
flnluiiin4:Calculatedfrom CL.E.C.FL., Edmat.iona1 StatistAs Yarhonk, 1974,
Table 21.
Column 5:Calculatedfrom O.E.C.D., Educational Statistics of the O.E.C.D.
Countries, Table 145.





Elasticity of Subst itut ion
As shown in (3), one of the key parameters in determining the extent to
which increases in supply of graduates relative to demand redace relative wages
is the elasticity of substitution between more and less educated workers. What
do .re knoi about the magnitude of this parameter?
In the 1960s, several analysts concluded that the key elasticity was
quite high, sufficiently large to yield a roughly horizontal demand curve.The
basicmode of analysis was to regress the relevant income ratios on relative
quantities, and certain control variables, assuming that relative quantities are
predetermined by past supply decisions. The first three stu.dieslisted in Table
1summarize the results of this work. Using a small sample of countries, Bowles
obtained a value of o of over 200. With a sample of 28 states from the United
States, Dougherty obtained a more moderate but still very highestimate of over
8. Since the impact of changes in the relative supplies on relative wages
depends inversely on the elasticity of substitution, the value of8 implies only
modest impacts of chanbes in relative supply on wages: an increase of, saj,
—36--
possible to rule out an explanation of the declinein the econo—
high levels of education in terms of a decline in relativedemand
Relative demand for graduates appears to have increased in the
at declining rates over time, as the technologically intensive
education and the government sectors——all of which employ large
proportions of graduates——grew, often rapidly. That demand increaseddoes not,
of course, imply that the pattern of demand shifts did not contribute to
observed changes in the relative incomes of graduates, for had it increased more
rapidly, the observed decline would have been more modest.—37—
100%in the relative supply or graduates wouLd reduce relative ourninbs by just
0.13 Psacharopoulos and Rinchiifte divided the country sample by derec of
development, finding an esserit Laity infinite elasticity in the developed
countries of concern. Since the relative income of graduates reneained const'snt
or increased in the 1950s and 19b0s, despite the increased supply of graduates,
these estimates were accepted as beinb rou,,hb in accord with reaLity anti taken,
by some, as reruting the "fixed coefficient" model of demand used by the
0.I￿.C.D., amou others, to analyse the grauuate and skiLled worker market.
In the 1970s, concurrent with the observed decline in the relative posi-
tion or graduates, new estimates based on better data and models provided a very
different picture of the relevant ebisticity. Tinbergen amplified the country
and state models to deal with the likely interaction of supply and denisrad in
determining relative wages and quantities, and obtained quite different reouLts
trots Bowles and Dougherty. His el.asticitteu ranged from about 1/2 to 2.00. L
used time series data for the United States to determine the iqiact of growth in
the relative number of raduates on relative earuinss arid obtained est1nateu of
a similar magnitude, ranging from I to 2.6. Helat Lveij moderate results were
also obtained between more and Less educated workers by Layard and )illon. By
the mid—lyTOs the value of the substitution elasticity parameter appeared to be
on the order of 1 to 2, which is of a magnitude that permits sizeable increases
in supply relative to demand to reduce the premium to highly educated workers.
Elasticity of supply
Thesecond key parameter in equation (3) is the elasticity of the supply
of students to universities. While research on this topic did not begin in ear-
nest untilthe mid—l970s, we have at this point several studies, which though—38-
TABLE 5
Estiirtesof the Elasticity of Substitution Between
Highly Educa ted and Less Educated_Workers
Study Sanle ____ 0
Bowles(1969) 12countrjes 202
Dougherty(1972) 28 states, U.S.A. 8.2
Psacharopoulos & 118countries developed 1000
Hinchliffe(1972) less developed2. 1—2. 5
Tinbergen (1974) 12 countries 0.6—1.2
28states 0.4—2.1
Freeman (1975) 24 years, U.S.A. 1.0—2.6
Layard andFallon(1975) 23 countries 0.6—3.5
Note: Definitions of highly educatedtoless educated vary somewhat between
samples. All except LayardandFallon treat college relative to some
other group. Layard and Fallon relate groups with 8 or riore years to
less than8.
Sources:Bowles, S., Planning Educational Systemsfor Econanic Growth,
HarvardUniversity Press, 1969.
Dougherty, C.R.S., 'Estimates of Labour Aggregation Functions',
J.P.E., 80, No. 6, 1101—1119.
Psacharopoulos, G. and Hinchliffe, K., 'Further Evidence on
theElasticity of Subsitution I\nong Different pes of Educated
Labour', J.P.E., 80, No. 4, 786—791.
Tinbergen,J., 'Substitution of Graduates by other Labour', Kyklos
Vol. 27, No. 2, 217—226.
Freeman, R., 'Overinvestment in College Training?', J.H.R., Surrmer
1975.
Layard, P.R.G. and Fallon, P.R., 'Capital-Skill Complementarity,
Income Distribution and Output Accounting', J .P.E., 83,
No. 2, 279—302.—39—
usindifferent data and methodologies, allsuggestthat the elasticity is on
the order of perhaps 1.5.
Table 5 summarizesthesestudies in a format comparable to that used in
Table -.Whatis impressive about the studies is that although they treat very
different forms of data, they obtain comparable magnitudes. Time series estima—
tes for the U.S. and U.K. range from 0.1 to 1.7, cross—country comparisons yield
estimates of 0.5 to 2.6;anaLysesusing individual data and a more structural
model yield afigureofabout2.0.
For the U.S., moreover, there is survey evidence whIch suggests that,
contrary to the traditional views of educators, students are hihly aware of,
and responsive to economic rewards. earty 50 percent of freshmen surveyed by
theAmerican Council of Education in 1971 agreed, for example, that a major
reason for going to college was that it would enabLe them to get a better
job.12 Nearly one—third cited "aole to make more money" as a verj important
reason for going to colleme. Similar results are obtained with questions
relating to choice of career. My 1969 survey of college students showed that
their expectations of salaries and of lifetime income profiles over fields
mirrored actual market circumstances.13
If there is indeed a non—negligible supply response to economic
opportunities, one would expect, at the least a slowdown in the growth of
enrollments relative to the relevant population in the 1910s. Columns 3)and
5—6 of Table 3 and figures 3 and )4 examine this expectation. The columns in the
table contrast percentage changes in the enrollments and in ratios in the
1960—1910 period to the 1970—76 period. In each countr' the rate ofincrease
enrollments decelerates; in all but one the ratio of enrollments declines
becoming negative in the U.S. and France and droing to below 1.07a in the—40--
Netherlands, Belgium and Canada.
The figures give more detailed time series information for the U.S. and
U.K. It shows the drop off in enrollments in the U.S. in the 1970s, con-
centrated among men, and reveals a similar fall in the U.K. toward the end of
the period, concentrated among women. Note that the figures for the U.K.
show a decline in the proportion enrolled in the period covered, in contrast
to the O.E.C.D. figures. One reason for this divergence is that the O.E.C.D.
figures refer to university—type higher education whereas the participation
rates in Figure 4 refer to all higher education, including teacher training
where enrollments have been dropping especially rapidly.
We conclude that there is a substantial elasticity of supply with
respect to salaries but that the elasticity is far from the infinite value
which would rule out a supply—demand explanation of observed changes.-41-
TABLE 5
Estimates_oftheElastic ity ofSupply ol' Persons to Higher Education
Study Sample
Freeman (1975) 24 years, U.S.A. 1.3 to 1.1
Tinbergen (1974) 12 countries 0.54 to 2.64
Rosen &Willis (1975) IndividuaLs in
NI3!H—Thorndike
sample,U.S.A. 2.00
Pissarides (1979) 20years,U.K. 1.12 to 1.31
Dolphin (1951) 13 years, IJ.K. 0.7
Source: Freeman, R., 'Overinvestment in College Training?', Journal al Human
Resources, Summer,1975.
Pissarides, R.A., 'Staying on at School in England and Wales —andWhy
9%ofthe 1976 AgeGroupDid Not' ,LondonSchool of Economics
Discussion Paper No. 63(November,1979).
Rosen, Sherwin & Willis, Robert J. ,'Education& Self—Selection' ,NB.LR
Workin Paper No. 2149 (June, 1978).
Tinbergen, J. ,'Substitutionof Graduates by Other Labour',_klos,
Vol. 27, No. 2, 217—226.
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Source:U.S.Bureau of theCensus, "School Enrollment", CurrentPopulation
Reports, Series P—20; various edttions, 1950—1979,TJ.S.Bureau ofLabor
Statistics , Employment of HiEhSchoolGraduates and Dropouts, SpeciaL
Labor Force Reports.Men






1 The rates for all higher educatiOn
exceeded 100 per cent in the earler yearsbecause they included a lar number of entrantst:
teacher-training with less than trA levels, who are not included amongstthe qualified leavers.
Age participation rates
(U .K.)
Source: Department of Education & Science, Statistical Bulletin, Sept. 1980, Charts 2 & 3
AcademiC year beginning ifl




Thes aridexp lariat ion of change
The preceding analysis suggests that the decline in the premium to
higher education found in Section 1 can potentially be explained as the resuLt
of a sizeable shift in supply of graduates, which exceededtheincrease in
demand, in conjunction with elasticities of substitution on the orderof 2.1)
andelasticities of supply on the order of 1.5. Using (:3) and those values of
oandc, we would expect increases in relative number of gradustes toreduce the
educational premium with an elasticity of about 0.3.Ifwe tako the increases
inrelative enrollment from 1960 to lY(b/19shownin lable 3asirid.icative of
thechange in relative supply of young graduates over the period, and. assuije
moderate increases inrelative demandfor graduates,e.g. l) per year, whichis
about the estimate I obtained for the U.S. (reeiuan, 1910, tabLe 5,p.),the
resultant figures suggest that the supply—demand explanation wilt fit the
observed experience to a reasonable extent: on avera0e, the growth rate of
relative enrollments in the final column of Table 3isnearLy )4.0% per annum;
taking S =4.o)';X =1.0%and i/ c +c)=.30in equation (3), thesefigures
yield a decline in the university premium of about 1% per annum, which Is
roughly in accord with thegeneralmagnitude of declines inmostcountries.
Since, of course, the timing and magnitude of changes differs considerably amon0
countries, thisexercise is meantsolely td show that the proposed explanation
is not grotesquely out of line. In the one case where I have tested the exFla—
nation using a regression model, (see Freeman, H. in Griliches, Z., W. KrelLe,
Li.Krupp, and 0. Kyn, 19(5), all of the 19b9—1chari0ein the U.S. was attri-
buted to the rapid growth of the relative supply of graduates. Note that the
reversal in growth of supply in the late l9(Us in the U.S. is crudely consistent
withtheobserved slackened decline! modest improvement in relative earnlri0s- 5-
ratiosat that time; cyclical factors, however, were also at work.
Whataboutalternativeexplanations of the changes?
Uric potential hypothesis is that in a period of stow/dec tirlinb growtn ot
real earnings, as characterized the 1910s, trade union/noverrlmeritat activities
to maintain the real position of manuaL workers rather than the supp1ydemarn1
market figures stressed here underLie the observed patterns. In the one casein
which I have examined thishypothesis,the data suggest that while union acttvL—
ties have operated in the predicteddirection,they have not been sufficientLy
sizeable to explain the observed patterns. Specifically in the U.S., where
about 20% of the labor force is organized, trade unions have raised their wabes
relative to those of nonunionmanuaL workersbyperhaps5percentagepoints in
theperiodstudied; if we assume, at an extreme, that halt of nongraduaten were
organized, this implies at most a 21/2 percenta,e point increaze in manualworker
earningsand thus a 21/2pointdecreasein thecolleuepremium,coripareu to
observed changes of 14—20 percentage points.
The future
Are the developments of the 1910s a permanent or a transitory
phenomenon? Will the preuhia to hiher education continue to decline, stabilize,
orrise in the future? In termsof the analysis given, theanswer depends on
whatTinbergen has called the 'race' between the growth of suppLy and the growth
ofdemand.1On the supply side, demographic forces and the reduced propensity
to enroll in higher education shown in Table 3 suggest that the principal cause
of the falling premia——rapid expansion of supply——will be arrested in the next
decade.In somecountries, notably the United States, demographic factors are
likelyto leadto an actual improvement in the economic status ofyourmo gra——46—
TABLE 6
Cross—sectionRelation Between Economic Development
and Private Returns to College rilrairing
c;7-Ofl07, O•l:OLY ]14c:i ncTn : rcp 1a
bt-.rC37tTdincc.in:1::a (. (;1liit i-vc:




Source:G. Psacharopoulos, 'Rates of Return to Investment inEducationAround
the World' ,ComparativeEducation Review, Vol. i6,No.1, February
1972, p. 6.Tableswith mean incomes calculated from Appendix Thhle,
p. 6.Thenumber for the fifth group has been corrected.—47—
duates as the number of young persons falls in the 1980s,decreasing the number
of young graduates and raising theirwages. In other o.h.C.D. countries the
demographicpatterns will produce declines in the number ofyoung persons at the
end ofthe 1980s, suggesting that any improvement in the position ofgraduates
will notbegin until then. The demographic chauge is likely to have less impact
onnongraduate workers because they tend to be more ready substitutes for older
workersthan are new university—trained personnel. In othercountries, the
demographic swings are lessdramatic, suggesting more modest chauges in the
marketin ensuing periods. On the demand side, it is difficult to forecasthow
technologyand related factors willshift relative demand schedules. Diverse
forecasts, based on varying assumptions about future economic developments,
suggest no extraordinary change in relative demands, which leaves the shifts in
supply as the main moving force in the market.
While there may be some upswing and while there is unlikely to beany
further deterioration in the relative economic position ofgraduates, at least
inthe l980s, I do not believe the market will rebound in general to suchan
extent as to restore pre—1910s graduate/nongraduate differentials.
In this regard, it is of some value to contrast the position of hi0hly
educated workers across countries. Mi else thesame, if the relative earnings
on return to college declined with level of development, one could be more
likelyto expect the reduced premium topersist than if development were unre-
latedto premium. 'Ible 6summarizesdatagatheredby G. Psacharopoulos which
shows a sizeable drop in private returns to college trainingwith development,
whichlends support to the notion that the diminished premium of the 1910s will
be more than a transient phenomenon.—48—
Another clue to the future maybefound in the evidence given by
30jtovk'in his 196 paper on the trend in professional. earnings. Scitovsky
examineddatafrom1810—1900tothe 1950s, finding a downward trend in most
westerncountries inthe ratio of professional earnings to the earnings of' other
workers,though his data revealed diverse patterns of' change for different pro-
fessions indifferentperiods. That the development at' the 1970s are at least
consistent with some long—run changes also suggests they will. not be entirely
reversedin ensuing decades.
Conclusion
Thispaper has examriinec diverse data on the changingeconomic position
ofgraduate workers in the major devetopencountries. It hss found
i) An overall trend in the 1910s and in some cases earlier toward a
lower graduate to nongraduate income ratio.
2)A distinct time pattern to the decline, whIch was most severe in
most countries in the early part of the decade.
3)Aworsening in the uneiqployment position of graduates, in some cases
relativeto the unemployment position of other workers.
l) A reduction in the upward trend and in some cases a reversal of the
trend in enrollments as a proportion of the relevant age group.
5) Estimates of substitution between more and less educated workers and
elasticities of' the supply of students on the order of 1—2, magnitudes which
permit shifts in supply and demand to have a sizeab.Le effect on wages.
The paper has advanced the hypothesis that the decline in the coLLege
premium is in fact due to the increase in supply during the period in condunc—
tion with the elasticity values given above. It has speculaten that the 1980s
will see a better market f'or graduates but not a return of the pre—19(Us econo-
micadvantage.—49--
Footnotes
1/ For a discussion of the chaning economic value of education in the U.S.
see H. Freeman (1916); for the U.K. see C. pissarides and A.M. Dolphin.
2/ See H. Freeman (l91() for a detaiLed evaluation of rates of return.
3/ See C. Pissarides for an effort to translate these fiures into present
values of earnings.
Countries for which the decline in earnings raLios was greater in the
early part of the decaue are: U.S. (all but one group), Australia, U.K. ,Japan,
France, Denmark, countries with a mixed pattern are: Canada and Germany. ItaLy
is the major exception to the generalization.
5/ Ratios of Indices of the Average Earningsof Nonmanual
toManual Workers in Common Market Countries, 1912—1919
1912 1916 1919
1. Denmark 1.00 .90 .81 —.13
2. Italy 1.00 .8i .i5 -.22
3. Netherlands 1.00 .96 .95 —.05
-i.Belgium 1.00 .95 .95 —.05
5.Germany 1.00 1.03 1.03 .03
6. France 1.00 .82 .85 —.15
1. United Kingdom (maLes) 1.00 .95 .94 —.06
Note: Averae earnings of nonmanualworLersrefer to average gross monthly
earnings. Average earnings of manual workers refer to average gross
hourly earnings.
Source: Eurostat. "Hourly Earninbs—-Hours of 4orkIt.
Tables:"Trendsof Average Gross Monthly Earnings of Nonmanual- Workers
byIndustrial Groups"; "Trends of AverageGrossRourLy Earnins of
Manualworkers by Industrial Groups".
6/ Since price and quantiLy adjustments can under some conditions substi-
tutefor one another this isnot a necessary condition for a narket to be
declining.—50—
7/ The L962—1968 data are reportedbythe Nat Loriat Center tor Bd(at Loria
Statistics, tine 3, Condition of Education 1919, table !L.1L, updated.I have
updated them using data from U.S. Bureau of' babor Statistics Bducatiorial
Attainment,t9[band 1979.
8/ SeeH. Freeiiari,The OvereducatedAmerican (AcaderiieP€e35, L9't'U)
9/ The U. 3.dataare froti Cur rent Popu Lat tori kep rinds , CorisIsrie r 1 rieotm
Ce ries P.—dO.
10/ The U.K. data are from University Grants Committee, Abstract of
Statistics.
TheJapanese data are from Umettuit , "toe Co tte6e arid the Rate of'Return
tohigherducatioriin Post—War Japan, L934--19l3".Universityof iscoristn,
1971.P1I.J). dissertatori.
12/ American CounciL on HducatLou,NationalNorms for Fall 1911.
13/ See R. Freeman, TheLaborMarket for Co11ee—Trained Workers (harvard
University Press, 1919).
14J See Tinber0en,p. 224.—51—
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